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Abstract  
Contradictory empirical and theoretical evidence on the relationship between 
innovation and competition has been reconciled in a model that yields an 
inverted U-shaped curve. I test whether the predictions of the model are 
supported by the data with an unbalanced panel of firms for 1990-2003 in a high 
productivity growth, high-tech industry, Finnish ICT manufacturing. In 
particular, I investigate how well alternative, yet rigorous measures of innovation 
and the technology gap, such as R&D intensity, R&D elasticity, technical 
change, technical efficiency and total factor productivity fare with respect to 
competition measured by the Lerner index. The results prove sensitive to the 
choice of variable. Overall, the model is not supported by the empirical evidence 
of the industry.  
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1. Introduction  
By definition, fully efficient firms form the global technology frontier. Since the frontier represents 
the state of the art in technology, it responds to innovation only. Meanwhile neoclassical theory 
postulates competition to reduce productive inefficiency. Yet, the Schumpeterian paradigm 
(Schumpeter, 1934) recognised monopoly rent prospects of the innovator as the central innovation 
incentive. Hence firms at the frontier are frequently sheltered from intense competition. The 
theoretical model of Aghion et al. (2005), postulating an inverted U-curve shaped relationship 
between innovation and competition, has proposed a way to reconcile controversial empirical 
findings between innovation and growth and the contradictions of industrial organisation (e.g. Dixit 
and Stiglitz 1977) and endogenous growth models ( e.g. Romer 1990, Aghion and Howitt 1992, and 
Grossman and Helpman 1991). The purpose of this paper is to explore the robustness of the 
predictions of the model on empirical evidence from an innovative industry subject to intense 
competition from abroad.  
According to the model, new technological breakthroughs can establish significant leads in 
competition and increasing returns for a while, until laggards copy and catch up with the innovators. 
Innovation increases at low levels of competition, reaches an optimum, and thereafter declines as 
competition intensifies and begins to discourage innovations as monopoly rents from innovation 
decline. The inverted U-shaped interrelationship emerges from the escape competition effect at low 
levels of competition, which turns into a Schumpeterian effect as higher levels of competition begin 
to discourage R&D investment. As empirical predictions of the inverted U-model, Aghion and 
Griffith (2005, page 57) list that 
1) additional product market competition (PMC) in frontier industries increases innovation;  
2) Vice versa, additional PMC in lagging industries reduces or increases innovation only 
weakly;’  
3) An increase in PMC in the economy on average reduces the share of frontier industries and 
raises the average technological gap. “The average fraction of frontier sectors decreases – 
namely, the average technological gap between incumbent firms and the frontier in their 
respective sectors increases – when competition increases”;  
4) As a result, the general effect of additional PMC on the economy follows an inverted U-
shape. Additional PMC encourages innovation at low levels of competition, but discourages 
it at high levels of PMC.  
In efficiency terms, this means that additional PMC in efficient industries increases innovation, and 
vice versa additional PMC in inefficient industries reduces or increases innovation less, and that 
additional PMC in the economy on average reduces the share of frontier firms or raises average 
inefficiency. In other words, there is a positive relationship between inefficiency and (additional) 
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 competition at the industry or economy-wide level. The more efficient the economy on average, the 
more inefficiency increases as a result of competition.  
Aghion and Griffith (2005) refer to productivity in the context of the innovation – competition 
dichotomy. They (page 49) state that “while competition appears to be effective at improving 
productivity levels in satisficing firms (those plagued with agency and managerial slack problems), 
this does not automatically translate into higher rates of productivity growth in such firms relative 
to more profit-maximizing ones.” In other words, competition can be effective in raising 
productivity in inefficient firms relative to more efficient firms, but not its growth rate. Innovation 
has been proxied by the level and growth rate of TFP also by Nickel (1996), who found evidence 
that more intense PMC is reflected in more rapid TFP growth. In practice, while innovation may 
raise productivity, high innovation input or output does not automatically translate into TFP growth. 
In addition, the use of productivity for innovation confuses the relationship of innovation with the 
frontier, also referred to in the Aghion et al. model. In economic theory, inefficiency is a relative 
term that measures the gap between the production possibilities frontier and the realized output. 
Productivity improvements, in contrast, reduce inefficiency in lagging firms, but increase it if the 
improver is a frontier firm. If firms are inefficient, competition is more likely to raise efficiency. 
Moreover, although all may be pushed to seek ways to improve their efficiency, the gap between 
successful firms and the rest may widen and average inefficiency increases.  
In addition to productivity, Aghion et al. (2005) applied patents as a measure of innovation and the 
Lerner index as a measure of competition. Subsequent literature, surveyed in the next section, has 
applied further measures of innovation and technology gaps. Tingvall and Poldahl (2006) test the 
predictions of the model on firm-level data, and find that the inverted U-shaped relation is 
supported by a Herfindahl index measure of competition, but not by a price cost margin.  
I contribute to the literature by testing whether results correspond to the theory if more rigorous 
determinants of innovation and technology gaps are applied, such as R&D intensity and technical 
efficiency. In particular, I apply frontier methodology to estimate the technology gap, and R&D 
intensity, R&D elasticity and technical change as proxies for innovation. The dataset is from an 
innovative and competitive industry, the Finnish ICT manufacturing industry during a period of 
rapid technological change, 1990-2003. At the time, the industry attracted technology adopters from 
abroad in the form of FDI. Hence, one can assume it to have been close to the frontier, while being 
open to intense competition from abroad.  
According to the predictions of the theory, if the industry was indeed at the frontier at the time, 
average technical efficiency in Finnish ICT manufacturing should be high, competition neck-and-
neck on the upward sloping part of the inverted U-curve. That is, additional competition should 
increase innovation. I seek answers to questions, such as is average technical efficiency high in the 
industry? Has competition increased technical inefficiency or innovation? Does technical 
inefficiency or total factor productivity (TFP) provide a good measure of innovation? The results 
prove sensitive to the choice of variable. Overall, the model is not supported by the empirical 
evidence of the industry.  
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 The next section reviews empirical applications of the theory. I present the data and variables in the 
third section, and methodology in the fourth section. The fifth section summarises the results and 
their implications are briefly discussed in section 6.  
2. Related Theories and Empirical Findings 
 
The literature on firm performance, competition, sources of innovation and industrial organisation 
extends beyond the Schumpeterian paradigm (Schumpeter, 1934), which recognised monopoly rent 
prospects of the innovator as the driving force of innovation. Arrow (1962) identified the profit 
appropriation opportunity of the new comer to arise from the public good properties of knowledge 
(spillovers). Bain (1951) found that rates of return of firms in relatively more concentrated 
industries were significantly higher than those in un-concentrated ones, interpreting it as evidence in 
favour of the now so-called structure conduct performance paradigm in industrial organization 
theory. 
Demsetz (1973 and 1974) challenged this view by arguing that abnormal profits reflect higher 
efficiency levels rather than monopoly profits, and that researchers need to distinguish between the 
impacts of efficiency on performance from those of market power. To test the cause, if collusion is 
present, then smaller firms should earn similar (if not higher) rates of return than large firms. If in 
contrast, efficiency is driving the rates of returns, then a positive correlation with the industry rate 
of return should only emerge for large firms. Similarly Carlsson (1972) found productive efficiency 
to increase with producer concentration, and explained it by the small size of the Swedish market 
relative to economies of scale in manufacturing. Caves (2007) has argued that efficiency rents and 
monopolistic profits (due to the dominance of one large buyer firm over many suppliers), may also 
coexist. The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm holds that if short-run competitive advantages 
are heterogeneous in nature and not perfectly mobile, they can be transformed into a sustained 
competitive advantage generating abnormal returns (Peteraf 1993, p180). 
Most traditional models of product market competition and innovation predicted a detrimental 
impact from competition on innovation and growth. These include e.g. the Hotelling linear model 
and the monopolistic competition model by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) 
propose that the anticipation of future competition deter entry and hence competition today. In the 
mid-1990’s, empirical findings began to contradict these theories, but the models applied so far 
suffered from linearity. The only exception was Scherer (1965), who showed how patenting activity 
increases with firm size, but with diminishing patenting relative to size. He questioned the role of 
large monopolistic conglomerates in technological progress, i.e., the Schumpeterian (Mark II) 
model of competition, innovation and growth. His view received support from subsequent empirical 
research. (Aghion & Griffith, 2005).  
Empirical findings of a positive relationship between product market competition and productivity 
growth have generated new models and theories on gradual technological progress that evolves step 
by step. That is first, lagging firms need to catch-up with market/technology frontier leaders by 
means of imitation, before they attempt to escape competition by means of innovation. (See e.g., 
Aghion, et al. 1997, or Aghion et al. 2001). Also in line with the theory, Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, 
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 Griffith and Howitt (2005) evaluate the predictions listed above with patent data on UK firms, and 
find that the inverted U-curve is steeper in more neck and neck (efficient) industries. E.g., the curve 
is steeper in the food and beverages sector, than in electronics and electrical products.  Other 
positive evidence for the inverted U-curve has been found by Kilponen and Santavirta (2007), who 
found that R&D subsidies to have adverse effects on competition in only extreme cases, but 
generally positive influences on innovation.  
In contrast, Gorodnichenko, Svenjar and Terrell (2010) claim to find no evidence on an inverted U-
curve for emerging markets firms, although what they find is in accordance with the downward 
sloping part of the inverted u-curve. That is, competition has a negative effect on innovation, 
especially for firms further from the frontier, but they do not rule out an inverted U relationship in 
more pro-business environments. 
Bos et al. (2013) proxy innovation with input-based (cost minimization) technical efficiency, and 
estimate the presence of an inverted u-curve between competition and technology gaps in the U.S. 
banking industry. They find consolidation to have reduced innovation. Similarly, Badunenko et al. 
(2006) consider efficiency as an overall measure of innovativeness, resulting from high productivity 
in production and the sale of highly priced innovative goods and services. It is unexpected that the 
technology gap has been used to proxy innovation, since it is a rather common presumption that 
efficiency and innovativeness are contradictory, because innovation requires some degree of slack. 
Particularly, industrial organization theories typically expect innovation to decline with efficiency 
enhancing competition (Aghion et al. 2005).  
Well before them, research by Hanusch and Hierl (1992) suggests that the relationship between 
profit margins and technical efficiency is not linear. Hanusch and Hierl analyzed the relationship 
between profitability and technical efficiency in German electronics and machinery industries and 
found it to be convex, i.e., enterprises enjoy increasing returns to their attempts to raise efficiency. 
They concluded suggestively that leading enterprises may be subject to strong efficiency pressures 
to maintain profitability relative to competition. Their data on R&D expenditures was sufficient 
only for the machinery industry. Since deviations from the production frontier were small, they 
concluded that the sample firms’ best strategy is innovation as opposed to imitation, in order to 
ensure technological leadership and above average profitability.  
3. The Data and Variables 
 
Empirical evidence is sought from a fairly homogenous innovative high-tech industry in the small 
country that is subject to intense competition from abroad. Asset seeking FDI into the industry 
during the sample period suggests it to have been close to a technology frontier, characterized by 
intense and rapidly evolving innovation and competition (Berghäll 2015). It therefore offers 
potential to test the predictions of the model in a concise setting with few disrupting unknowns. 
While external validity requires more extensive evidence on other industries and countries, the 
empirical research needs to be carried out separately by industry to avoid unrealistic production 
function assumptions with respect to underlying technologies. The present exercise therefore 
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 contributes to the literature with an example of an innovative industry, which may have 
counterparts in other countries and high-tech industries.  
3.1 The ICT industry data 
The unbalanced panel of ICT manufacturing firms was constructed from the Longitudinal Database 
on Plants in Finnish Manufacturing 11974-2002, Financial Statements Statistics2 1986–2003, and 
R&D Surveys 1985–2003 at Statistics Finland. R&D, capital, labour and value-added data were 
available for 988 observations of 164 firms and 1282–1357 observations of plants over the period 
1990–2003. Altogether 3–4% of observations were removed due to negative or missing value-added 
when logarithms were taken, extreme annual variation or impossible value-added figures. Summary 
statistics of the final 928 observations are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Firm level summary statistics for key variables 
 
  N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Value added (€), (Y)  928 15.63 1.56 11.42 22.59 
Capital (€), (K) 928 14.68 1.98 5.38 20.11 
No of personnel minus R&D  personnel , (L) 928 4.64 1.38 .00 8.97 
R&D capital stock (€), (R) 928 13.69 2.34 6.72 20.36 
Lerner  928 .17 .0012 .17 .18 
R&D intensity 928 8.88 1.99 .35 13.75 
R&D elasticity 928 .047 .1 -.35 .31 
Technical change 928 .013 .044 -.14 .17 
 
In the production function, real value-added measures output (Y), the dependent variable. There are 
three main independent variables: Non-R&D labour (L), the physical capital stock (K) and the R&D 
stock (R). Labour input is proxied by total firm personnel due to data shortages on hours worked. 
As R&D was included as an input, R&D employees were deducted from the total number of labour 
input to avoid double-counting (see e.g. Hall and Mairesse 1995). The LDPM database provides 
proxies for physical capital, built from machine and equipment investments using the perpetual 
inventory method with a ten percent depreciation rate, i.e.,  ttt IKK  1)1(   where δ is the 
depreciation rate. Similarly, R&D capital stocks were built from total intramural R&D investments, 
available in the R&D panel, based on the perpetual inventory method. The initial R&D stock was 
based on data from 1985–1989 when available, and estimated with a 30% depreciation rate, in line 
with rapid technological development (confirmed by the results) and a prior finding for electrical 
products Bernstein and Mamuneas (2006)3.  
                                                 
1 LDPM/ Teollisuustilasto. 
2 Tilinpäätöspaneeli. 
3 The depreciation of the R&D stock (δ) is most often fixed arbitrarily at 15% (Hall, 2010). Pakes and Schankerman 
(1984) have estimated an average rate of 25% also from patent renewal data, and recently Bernstein and Mamuneas 
(2006) have estimated industry-specific rates that range from 18% for chemicals to 29% for electrical products. 
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 Firm level data on capital and labour was obtained by summing up plant levels in the LDPM 
database by firm. Analysis at the firm level avoids the questionable division of R&D capital plant-
wise, as well as the comparison of units within the same firm as if they competed.   
Due to data shortages, as well as for homogeneity of the sample, the analysis concerns only 
innovative firms with at least 20 employees. Large firms dominate the industry in terms of sales and 
R&D. Though small and microfirms are large in number, 89% in 1993 and 86% in 2004, their share 
of total employees was only 12% and 7% respectively, and even less of total turnover 6% and 2%, 
or total wage costs 9% and 5% respectively for 1993 and 2003. Their exclusion therefore cuts out 
only about 10% of total economic activity in the industry. In 2003, the true number of firms 
operating in the industry rose to almost 1700, and 233 if only firms with over 20 employees are 
considered. Larger firms cover over 90% of the private R&D carried out in the industry, which in 
turn represents over half of total corporate R&D in Finland. The exclusion of smaller firms does not 
confuse the analysis because estimation results showed most results to be (strictly) increasing in 
size, and consequently, the potential direction of microfirms’ impact is rather obvious.  
To avoid selectivity bias caused by the exclusion of loss-making and indebted firms when 
logarithms are taken, Lerner values and debt ratios were adjusted by adding the maximum loss or 
maximum debt to all observations plus one, as is recommended in the literature. About 3–4% of 
observations were removed due to negative or missing values when logarithms were taken, extreme 
annual variation or impossible value-added figures. Due to data secrecy requirements, there was no 
other basis for the exclusion of outliers other than their extremeness in value. In frontier analysis, 
such a cause is even more suspect than usual, as it could lead to the removal of frontier firms 
defeating the purpose of the exercise. Nominal variables were deflated with sectoral producer price 
indices at the 2 and 3 digit levels (1995=100), with the exception of R&D prior to 1995, for which 
the general earnings level index was used (due to the unavailability of alternatives).  
In consequence, panel firms can be assumed to be subject to similar (minimal) regulation, 
demonstrate similar behaviour, i.e., profit or revenue maximizing, allowing me to apply an output 
distance function, i.e., an output oriented efficiency measure. In addition, firms can be assumed to 
fit into the same functional form of the production function for their relative efficiencies to be 
comparable.  
3.2 Innovation variables 
Aghion et al. use patents, i.e., an innovation output measure for innovation. Innovation ouput can 
also be approximated by technical change and R&D elasticity. Innovation, however, may refer to 
the innovation inputs, for which R&D provides more accurate estimates. Innovation input is 
measured by R&D intensity (R&D Capital/ No. of Personnel), which does not vary by the model 
applied, though it is not constant over time and firm size (Figure 1).  In contrast, innovation output 
measures (implemented innovative activity), which is measured by R&D elasticity and technical 
change were estimated.  
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 Figure 1. Log R&D intensity over 1990-2003 for different firm size groups 
 
 
 
 
 
Various other firm characteristics are listed in Table 2 such as firm size (number of employees, 6 
categories), firm age (4 categories), and the firm leverage (debt ratio). Aghion et al. (2005) have 
argued firm leverage to be positively related with innovation to escape the risk of bankruptcy. Also 
firm size and age are expected to have a significant impact on innovation, the direction varying by 
technological regime. The Schumpeterian hypothesis deems firm size to be conducive to R&D, 
while the so-called Schumpeterian Mark I regime characterises situation in which technological 
progress emerges from new technology-based firms through a process of creative destruction (see 
e.g. Nelson and Winter, 1982). Although most formal R&D is concentrated in large corporations, 
Acs and Audretsch (1991) argue that small firms account for a disproportionate share of new 
product innovation, given their low formal R&D expenditures. Audretsch (1995) confirms that the 
empirical evidence on their role as engines of innovative activity in certain industries is robust, and 
yet the link between R&D and innovation disappears as the unit of observation is reduced to the 
firm level, particularly with small firms. Small is typically new, but since it proved impossible to 
establish an exact age for each firm, firms were merely grouped into 4 age categories. 
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 Table 2. Frequency Distribution of Firms by Debt Ratio, Age and Number of Personnel 
 
Debt ratio Freq. (%) 
Age in 
years 
Freq. 
(%) 
Size by number of 
personnel Freq. (%) Exports Freq. (%) 
< 50% 594 (60%) years ≤2 
244 
(25%) 20 ≤ labour <50 347 (35%) No 130 (13%) 
50-100% 151 (15%) 
2<years 
≤4 
144 
(15%) 50 ≤ labour <100 167 (17%) Yes 858 (87%) 
>100% 243 (25%) 
4<years 
≤7 
135 
(14%) 100 ≤labour <250 195 (20%)   
  7<years 
465 
(47%) 250 ≤labour <500 119 (12%)   
    labour ≥ 500 160 (16%)   
Total 988  988  988  988 
  
3.3 Competition variables 
The primary competition measure was specified as a firm specific Lerner index based on firm 
operating profit divided by the value of gross output (turnover), i.e., profit margin. Operating profit 
was derived from firm value added minus factor input costs, i.e., expenses including payroll taxes 
and social security payments incurred by the firm, as well as capital costs as indicated by financing 
expenses in firm profit and loss statements. The Lerner Index is common to the literature due to its 
significant advantages in measurement (Aghion & Griffith, 2005, page 22) and is in accordance 
with the microeconomic principle that high profit margins equal imperfect competition. For 
example, domestic market shares are rather irrelevant since the share of international trade in the 
industry is high.The Lerner index overcomes the difficulties inherent in input and output price 
measurement, and quality change, since the measure of competition is defined by the profits of 
firms. Since all firms operate in the same country, general price level and foreign exchange 
conditions are the same for all firms. In accordance with the microeconomic principle that high 
profit margins equal imperfect competition, increased competition is expected to reduce profit 
margins. Rates of returns are indicated similarly to Aghion et al. (2005) with a firm specific Lerner 
index, which is common to the literature due to its significant advantages in measurement (Aghion 
and Griffith 2005, page 22).  Here, the Lerner index is based on firm operating profit divided by the 
value of gross output (turnover), i.e., profit margin, price cost margin or mark-up.  
In contrast, domestic market shares, such as the Herfindahl index, are rather deceptive measures of 
competition when most of it originates from abroad. Moreover, according to survey results by 
Gilbert (2006), empirical research based on market concentration to proxy competition has not 
reached definite conclusions on the relationship between market structure and R&D, once industry 
characteristics, technological opportunities and appropriability were controlled for.  
In 1990-1993, the economy plunged into a deep recession. Yet, profitability was rapidly regained in 
the industry (Figure 2) with radical innovation. Net entry into the industry was high until mid 
1990’s, falling subsequently to exit levels by the end of the decade. Entry-based competition 
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 revived only after 2005. Thereafter profitability gradually declined and competition intensified. 
While average competition (1-Log Lerner) has intensified very gradually, competition actually 
declined for the largest firms as Figure 3 above shows over the sample period. On average, 
production growth (gy) correlates significantly (0.30) with the Lerner index, showing boom times to 
raise profitability. In contrast, recessions intensify competition, as one would expect. Low 
profitability is expected to signal intense competition.  
Figure 2. Evolution of the Lerner Index over the sample period 
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 Figure 3. Evolution of competition (1-Log Lerner) over the sample period for different firm 
sizes4 
 
 
 
Another determinant of inefficiency related to global competition is foreign ownership. Data on 
foreign firms is available for 1993-2002, with an emphasis observable for 1997-2002, but since the 
entire industry is subject to global competition, foreign ownership is of little relevance. Related 
research has found inward FDI into the industry to have been most likely asset-seeking (see 
Berghäll 2015).  
3.4 Determinants of the technology gap 
Technological gaps between leaders and followers are measured by Battese-Coelli (1995) technical 
inefficiencies following the inverted u-curve shaped theoretical predictions of the relationship 
between innovation and competition. Thus technical inefficiency also estimates innovation impacts. 
Technical efficiency results were compared with other reasonable indicators of innovation, such as 
technical change (implemented innovative activity), R&D intensity, an input measure and R&D 
elasticity, an innovation output measure.  
The analysis concerns only innovative firms. Since the industry is highly R&D intensive, the R&D 
requirement does not introduce a selectivity bias. It has the beneficial corollary that panel firms can 
be assumed to be subject to similar (minimal) regulation, demonstrate similar behavior. In addition, 
I can assume the firms to fit into the same functional form of the production function for their 
relative efficiencies to be comparable.  
                                                 
4 Size 1: 20  –  50; Size 2: 50 – 100; Size 3: 100 – 250 ;Size 4: 250 – 500; Size 5: over 500.  
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 4. Methodology 
The inverted u-curve model does not argue causality. I am therefore only interested in correlations 
of competition and innovation in this context. Technology gaps, in contrast, are estimated with 
parametric and non-parametric methodologies. Otherwise estimation methods depend on the 
estimator. Technical change and R&D elasticity are estimated with maximum likelihood. The 
impact of competition on the technology gap is estimated with true fixed and Battese-Coelli 
efficiency. 
4.1 Firm level estimates 
The key insight Farrell (1957) proposed was to extract information from extreme observations of 
the data to determine the best practice production frontier, rather than having to rely on some 
hypothetical production possibilities curve. A flexible translog functional form was assumed to 
approximate the production technology, following Heshmati et al. (1995):  
),exp();,,( ititititit RLKfY      (1)  
where itY is the output of the i-th firm observed in period t, f(.) represents the production technology, 
K is physical capital, L is non-R&D labour, R is R&D capital input and  is a vector of parameters 
to be estimated. The following flexible translog (transcendental) production function was assumed 
to approximate production technology:  
,ln½
lnln)(ln½lnln
2
2
0
ititj jitjtttit
hj h hitjitjhj jitjjjitj jit
uvtXtt
XXXXY



  


  (2) 
where the ’s denote parameter estimates of the production function, i the company, j and h denote 
inputs (i.e., logarithms of physical capital (k), non-R&D labour (l) and R&D capital (r)), and t the 
time period (i.e., the year concerned). Also Cobb-Douglas forms of the model were tested and 
found to apply only for the international data comparison.  
R&D elasticity, i.e., the percentage change of output divided by the percentage change of R&D, 
was obtained from the first derivative of the production function with respect to R&D: 
.lnln
ln
ln   h jthitjhjitjjjijtitijt tXXX
YE    (3) 
where ijtE is firm, input and time varying, respectively.  
The rate of exogenous technical change was obtained as: 
.lnln  j ijtjttttitit XttYTC     (4) 
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 where itTC  is neutral if 0jt  for all inputs j. In other words, technical change merely represents 
the change in the production function with respect to time. 
4.2 Data Envelopment Analysis for technical efficiency measures 
Several estimation methods were used to confirm and check results. State of the art true fixed and 
random effects estimates of technical efficiency proved unreasonable. Instead, for consistency and 
comparability of results, as well as to abstain from potentially distorting assumptions, non-
parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) was applied to estimate technical efficiency. DEA 
applies linear programming to compare relative performance when the production process involves 
multiple inputs and outputs. In contrast to stochastic frontier modeling, there is no need to specify a 
mathematical form for the production function beforehand, since the method simply seeks the 
points that maximize output given inputs (output-oriented measure) or minimize inputs given output 
(input-oriented measure). Hence DEA efficiency results do not depend on the above formulation of 
the production function. Several programs are available to carry out the linear programming 
problem. Hence its complexity in terms of the number of inputs and outputs causes no constraint. 
Most efficient firms receive a score of one, and less efficient a score somewhere below one, but 
above zero. At the same time, the major drawback of the method is the fact that there is no 
adjustment for outliers. Yet, it is simple to check visually how the efficiency estimates are 
distributed and how “unreasonable” outliers are.  
 
The original constant returns DEA methodology was developed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes 
(1978). In 1984, Banker, Charnes and Cooper developed it further into a variable returns to scale 
(VRS) version. The differences in the input and output-oriented measures reveal whether returns to 
scale are not constant, decreasing or increasing. When input-based efficiency is smaller than the 
output-based, returns to scale are decreasing5. If returns to scale appear to be increasing, output-
based efficiency measures are generally higher, but there is no clear rule on which measure should 
be selected.  
As a robustness check, so-called order-m efficiencies were also estimated. The methodologies are 
described in more detail for instance in Daraio and Simar (2007). 
5. Results 
 
According to the predictions of the model, if the industry is indeed at the frontier, average technical 
efficiency should be high, competition neck-and-neck and firms located on the upward sloping part 
of the inverted U-curve. That is, additional competition should increase innovation. Whether this is 
the case, is inspected by seeking answers to the following questions: Is average technical efficiency 
high in the industry? Has competition increased technical inefficiency or innovation? Does 
technical inefficiency or total factor productivity (TFP) provide a good measure of innovation? 
                                                 
5 See e.g. Coelli (1996) pages 6-7.   
12
 5.1 Is average technical efficiency high in the industry? 
Parametric efficiency estimates vary greatly by the methodology chosen. Hence the assumptions 
underlying them appear to influence results significantly. Therefore, after checking for outliers, 
results for non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) measures are presented (Figure 4). 
Both input and output based DEA measures are high. The input-based measure showed smallest 
firms as most efficient, while the output measure showed the largest firms to huddle closest to the 
frontier. Since their difference suggests increasing returns to scale, and firm size clearly contributes 
to efficiency, the largest firms appear to be the most efficient, and the output-based measure more 
reliable.  
Figure 4. Scatter plot of input-based and output-based DEA technical efficiency 
 
 
5.2 Has competition increased technical inefficiency on average?  
Determinants of inefficiency show competition to contribute significantly to inefficiency in the 
Battese-Coelli inefficiency model estimated with maximum likelihood. Efficiency is an increasing 
function of profit margins. In contrast, foreign ownership and exporter status did not prove to be 
significant determinants of inefficiency (Table 3). Exposure to global competition does not seem to 
affect technical efficiency. Moreover, the correlation between competition and technical efficiency 
was significant and negative: Input-based DEA -0.15 and output-based DEA -0.40 (Table 4). 
Competition increases technical inefficiency, but the relationship is not linear, as Hanusch and Hierl 
(1992) have suggested. These results run counter to the neoclassical assumption that efficiency 
increases with competition, but are in line with the inverted u-curve (Aghion and Griffith, 2005, 
page 71-72), i.e., increasing the threat of competition advances innovation in the more efficient 
firms, but dampens it in inefficient firms. Yet, Figures 5 – 7 provide a better fit than inverted U-
curves.  
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 Table 3. Maximum likelihood estimates on panel data and determinants of Battese-Coelli and 
DEA technical inefficiency6 (δ=30% R&D depreciation rates) 
Variable    Average 
δ0  Intercept for efficiency 25.46** 
δ1  Log Lerner index (profits/turnover) ‐4.23*** 
δ2  Log debt ratio  0.75 
δ3  Log capital intensity  0.05 
δ4  Log R&D intensity  ‐0.08*** 
δ5  Type 2 (Foreign‐owned) 0.16 
δ6  Exp2  (Exporter)  0.16 
δ7  Size 2  ‐0.26*** 
δ8  Size 3  ‐0.64*** 
δ9  Size 4  ‐0.82*** 
δ10  Size 5  ‐1.18*** 
δ11  Age 2  ‐0.12 
δ12  Age 3  ‐0.24* 
δ13  Age 4  ‐0.16 
δ14  Localisation 2  0.04 
δ15  Localisation 3  0.16 
δ16  Urbanisation 2  ‐0.11 
δ17  Urbanisation 3  ‐0.26 
λ  Lambda  0.65*** 
γ  Gamma   
σu  Sigma(u)  0.31*** 
σ2   
DEA (output)  Mean efficiency  0.85 
RTS  Mean scale elasticity 0.65 
Elast  Mean technical change 0.01 
Elask  Mean capital elasticity 0.12 
Elasl  Mean labor elasticity 0.49 
Elasr  Mean R&D elasticity  0.05 
 
                                                 
6 Since true fixed effects results were similar to Battese-Coelli results and true random effects varied off limits, only 
Battese-Coelli results are reported above for comparison.  
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 Figure 5. Scatter plot of technical efficiency (output-based DEA) and competition 
(1-unadjusted Lerner) 
 
Figure 6. Scatter plot of technical efficiency (output-based DEA) and the Lerner index  
(profit margins adjusted to loss-making firms) 
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 Figure 7. Scatter plot of technical efficiency (input-based DEA) and the Lerner index  
(profit margins adjusted to loss-making firms) 
 
5.3 Can inverted u-curves be found between competition and innovation?  
Results with respect to innovation are somewhat contradictory. As Table 4 shows, the correlation is 
contradictory with respect to innovation and competition. While competition is associated with 
significantly increased R&D intensity (1% level), and R&D elasticity (at the 5% significance level), 
competition is associated with significantly decelerated technical change (1% level). It may be that 
product related innovation is conducive to intense competition, but when it comes to process 
innovation (technical change), competition decelerates it. Yet, as Figures 8-10 below show, an 
inverted u-curve relationship between innovation and competition could only be found for technical 
change and competition. For R&D intensity and elasticity, the relationship was more of a u-curve. 
In all cases, however, the fit was not convincing.   
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 Figure 8. Scatter Plot of Innovation (technical change) on Competition (1-Lerner). Correlation 
 
Figure 9. Scatter Plot of Innovation (R&D elasticity) on Competition (1-Lerner) 
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 Figure 10. Scatter Plot of Innovation (R&D Intensity) on Competition (1-Lerner) 
 
 
5.4 Does technical inefficiency provide a good measure of innovation? The relationship between 
technical efficiency and technical change 
 
Results do not support technical efficiency as an appropriate measure of innovation. As Table 4 
shows, input-based DEA correlates significantly at the 1 % level, but negatively with R&D 
elasticity (-0.14) and technical change (-0.28). Its correlation with R&D intensity is insignificant 
and almost zero.  Hence, input-based DEA technical efficiency is not a proxy to innovation. As for 
output-based DEA, it correlates positively and significantly at the 1 % level with technical change 
(0.22), and positively and significantly at the 5 % level with R&D intensity (0.08).  Its correlations 
with R&D elasticity is insignificant and almost zero.  Hence, output-based DEA may proxy 
technical change and perhaps R&D intensity, but the correlations are fairly small.  
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 Table 4. Pearson Correlation, Sig. (2-tailed), N=928, total sample 
 Compet
i-tion 
(4) 
R&D 
intensity 
(rdint) 
Elasticity 
of R&D 
(elasr) 
Technica
l change 
(elast) 
Input-
based  
DEA 
efficien
cy 
Output-
based  
DEA 
efficien
cy 
Scale 
elasticity 
(rts) 
Growth 
of 
output 
(gy) 
Output 
based 
TFP 
growth 
Labour 
produc-
tivity  
Competiti
on (4) 
1 0.15** 0.07* -0.11** -0.15** -0.4** -0.07* -0.39** 0.32** -0.19**
  0 0.031 0.001 0 0 0.03 0 0 0
928 928 928 928 925 925 928 769 769 928
R&D 
intensity 
(rdint) 
0.15** 1 0.46** -0.30** 0.01 0.08* -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 0.36**
0   0 0 0.733 0.017 0.06 0.356 0.058 0
928 928 928 928 925 925 928 769 769 928
Elasticity 
of R&D 
(elasr) 
0.07* 0.46** 1 -0.56** -0.14** 0.02 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 0.17**
0.031 0   0 0 0.493 0.439 0.056 0.139 0
928 928 928 928 925 925 928 769 769 928
Technical 
change 
(elast) 
-0.11** -0.30** -0.56** 1 -0.28** 0.22** 0.83** 0.13** 0.20** -0.07*
0.001 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0.027
928 928 928 928 925 925 928 769 769 928
Input-based  
DEA 
efficiency 
-0.15** 0.01 -0.14** -0.28** 1 0.53** -0.48** 0.13** -0.09* 0.24**
0 0.733 0 0   0 0 0 0.017 0
925 925 925 925 925 925 925 767 767 925
Output-
based  
DEA 
efficiency 
-0.4** 0.08* 0.02 0.22** 0.53** 1 0.24** 0.38** -0.17** 0.42**
0 0.017 0.493 0 0   0 0 0 0
925 925 925 925 925 925 925 767 767 925
Scale 
elasticity 
(rts) 
-0.07* -0.06 -0.03 0.83** -0.48** 0.24** 1 0.11** 0.20** 0.03
0.03 0.06 0.439 0 0 0   0.002 0 0.453
928 928 928 928 925 925 928 769 769 928
Growth of 
output (gy) 
-0.39** -0.03 -0.07 0.13** 0.13** 0.38** 0.11** 1 -0.81** 0.14**
0 0.356 0.056 0 0 0 0.002   0 0
769 769 769 769 767 767 769 769 769 769
Output 
based TFP 
growth 
0.32** -0.07 -0.05 0.20** -0.09* -0.17** 0.20** -0.81** 1 -0.08*
0 0.058 0.139 0 0.017 0 0 0   0.029
769 769 769 769 767 767 769 769 769 769
Labour 
produc-
tivity 
-0.19** 0.36** .017** -0.07* 0.24** 0.42** 0.03 0.14** -0.08* 1
0 0 0 0.027 0 0 0.453 0 0.029   
928 928 928 928 925 925 928 769 769 928
 
The finding that technical efficiency is not a good measure of innovation questions the external 
validity of estimations of Bos et al. (2013), which used input-based (cost minimization) technical 
efficiency to proxy innovation to estimate the presence of an inverted u-curve between competition 
and technology gaps. Even in this respect, the relationship resembles that of a (non-inverted) u-
curve. As Figure 11 shows, competition is minimized at a higher efficiency level7. In other words, 
most efficient firms have indeed escaped competition. Even if technical efficiency could proxy 
                                                 
7 The figure applies an output-based measure, since the input-based measure did not fit a u-curve. 
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 innovation, the relationship between technical efficiency and competition is far from a robust 
inverted u-curve. An important factor that distinguishes efficiencies is firm size. As Figure 12 
shows, the most (output-based DEA) efficient largest and smallest firms enjoy actually the most 
rapid technical change. This is the result also on average for the sample. The positive relationship is 
pronounced only for the largest firms with respect to input-based DEA. Even with a quadratic 
function the relationship is straightforward, more efficiency is good for innovation (Figure 13).  
Figure 11. Scatter plot of technical efficiency (input-based DEA) and competition (1-unadjusted 
Lerner) 
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 Figure 12. Scatter plot of innovation (technical change) on technical efficiency (output-based 
DEA) on firm size 
 
Figure 13. Scatter plot of innovation (technical change) on technical efficiency (input-based 
DEA) on firm size 
 
For R&D elasticity, a vaguely inverted U-curve could be traced only for input-based DEA (Figure 
14). there seems to be an efficiency optimum that maximizes innovation below full efficiency. 
Output-based DEA shows inefficient firms as typically small. Input-based DEA, however, showed 
smallest firms as most efficient. Profit margins increased with efficiency across the board regardless 
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 of firm size, and small firms have been more R&D intensive on average. Thus, contrary to the 
predictions of the inverted u-curve theory, small firms that have on average been furthest from the 
frontier have also been most keen to escape competition by means of innovation.  
Figure 14. Scatter plot of innovation (R&D elasticity) on technical efficiency (input-based DEA) 
 
In sum, the predictions of the inverted u-curve theory are controversial in relating innovation and 
the concept of efficiency. TFP and technical efficiency do not appear to provide adequate proxies of 
innovation. Output-based DEA may proxy technical change, and perhaps R&D intensity, but the 
correlations are small though significant. Output-based TFP correlates significantly (at the 1 % 
level) and positively with technical change (0.20), but not with R&D intensity or R&D elasticity.  
TFP may proxy technical change, but the correlation is rather small.  
5.5 Does total factor productivity (TFP) provide a good measure of innovation? 
Innovation has also been proxied by the level and growth rate of TFP. E.g. Nickel (1996) found 
evidence in line with the neoclassical postulation that more intense product market competition 
(PMC) is reflected in more rapid TFP growth. In my sample, in contrast, there is little correlation 
between TFP and innovation. Output-based TFP correlates positively significantly at the 1 % level 
and with technical change (0.20), but not with R&D intensity or R&D elasticity (Table 4). As 
Figures 15 – 18 below show, a slight positive correlation could be detected only for technical 
change. In conclusion, TFP would not appear to provide a good measure of innovation.  
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 Figure 15. Scatter plot of productivity (output-based TFP) on innovation (log R&D intensity) 
 
Figure 16. Scatter plot of productivity (output-based TFP) on innovation (R&D elasticity) 
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 Figure 17. Scatter plot of productivity (output-based TFP) on innovation (technical change) 
 
Figure 18. Scatter plot of productivity (output-based TFP) on competition (1-unadjusted Lerner) 
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 6. Discussion and conclusions 
 
Average technical efficiency is high in the industry. Competition increases technical inefficiency on 
average. In these respects, the evidence with respect to the industry being on the technology frontier 
is clear, but overall, the evidence in support of the inverted U-curve relationship is weak and 
contradictory. Results are sensitive to the proxies and methodologies applied. In conclusion, I 
contribute to the literature by showing that model predictions cannot be generalized into stylized 
facts of the relationship between competition and innovation. 
In addition to Schumpeterian models and the inverted u-curve, the finding that the most profitable 
firms and plants are also to be the most efficient, combined with the finding that profit margins 
increased with efficiency across the board regardless of firm size, are in line with so-called 
resource-based views of the firm, in contrast to traditional structure conduct performance or 
contemporary industrial organization views. Efficient small firms are also profitable, although large 
firms are generally the most efficient. Hence, the causality may run from efficiency (and 
innovativeness) to profit margins and firm growth, i.e., there are efficiency rents that firms may be 
able to transform into long term competitive advantages that generate abnormal returns. Overall, the 
industry seems to reflect the Schumpeterian Mark II hypothesis of creative accumulation, rather 
than creative destruction.  
Competitive and innovation conditions can, at least to some extent, be tampered with, by e.g. 
generous R&D support to bridge the disincentive gap between private and social returns – hence 
their appeal. This evidence suggests, however, that tampering with competitive conditions to raise 
innovation is futile. Innovation within smaller firms is already relatively high in terms of R&D 
intensity, while technical change is R&D saving and the two correlate negatively.  
One should not confuse productivity with efficiency when discussing the beneficial effects of 
competition. Competition may e.g. increase productivity, but not necessarily average efficiency. 
Second, when there are large differences in technical efficiencies that are due to other factors than 
innovation and competition, such as simple scale efficiencies, technological gaps may provide 
insufficient guidance on the impact of competition on innovation. Efficiency measures distance 
from the technology frontier, while it is technological progress that expands the production 
possibilities frontier through innovation. The most efficient firms are likely to be highly innovative, 
but for the rest, efficiency change merely measures imitation based catch-up with frontier firms. 
Some level of slack may even be necessary in highly innovative industries. Efficiency-raising may 
be counterproductive to innovation.  
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